Post World War II Peace and Reflcections

Since this is the last blog of the semester I thought I'd talk about something that unified many of the events we've discussed in the course. For the last 65 years in West Germany and the last 20 in East Germany has been a modern, peaceful, and prosperous nation. This stands in sharp contrast to the majority of the time we've discussed in the course. From the time of Bismarck through World War II, Germany was defined by war and issues of hte causes and blame for its aggression have been the focal point for much discussion on German history. However in the success of modern Germany I feel imporatant lessons can be learned.

After World War II the allies did not punsish the German people and rebuilt it along with otehr allied nations who had been decimated by the conflict. This stood in sharp contrast to the punitives measures of Versailles, and the reparations the Germans had imposed on the French after the Franco-Prussian War. Each war had led to another, and each conflict had led to even greater tension in Europe. However this last time it was different. Traditional enemies were able to reconcile their differences, and Germany was able to rebuild its economy with help. The victors had offered an olive branch and it was taken.

I feel this is an important lesson and not an unprecented one in history either. A similar event happened in the Concert of Europe after Napoleon's defeat which also led to a long period of peace after a time of great turbulence. Sometimes blame doesn't work. So as we continue to assess who was responsible for the rise of the Nazis, who caused World War I, or what about Germany made it possible for the Holocaust to occur, let us ask ourselves if that is really what is important. There will always be war and there will always be conflict. Nations will always have enemies as well. Maybe the lesson we should really look to is what caused the lasting peace and prosperity which has occured in Europe in recent times. If you look at European history the 65 years of peace the European powers have enjoyed really is unprecedented.

The Actions of Ordinary Men

The slaughters of the Holocaust were perhaps the most brutal event in modern history. Some of the actions were so cold and calculated that it is nearly impossible to conceive of such actions being commited by normal human beings. However in reality those who commited the attrocities in Poland were in fact representative of a large nation. The men of Police Batallion 101 were not a bunch of sadistic psychopaths. In fact many of them had normal lives with jobs and families prior to 1941.

It is clear from the readings that the men were given an opportunity to back out before the first massacre and could certainly lay out in most cases even without being officially excused. Most still chose to participate but many did seem disturbed emotionally by the events which occured. Trapp himself seems to have been disturbed deeply by having to give the order. Goldhagen would have us believe that this could simply be attributed to this being their first time doing somethign like this and that they were not genuinely concerned for those who they were slaughtering. However Goldhagen does not seem receptive to any explanation other than willful decisions primarily taken because of anti-semitism. Something I did learn about Goldhagen from reading biographical information is that Goldhagen's own father was a holocaust survivor and that he has always been quick to hold everyone strictly accountable for their actions.

To me it seems far more likely that a series of societal and psychological factors unique to being part of a military environment in Nazi Germany caused these men to commit the acts described. Police Batallion 101 was comprised of ordinary Germans. It's highly unlikely that they would have acted this way left to their own devices without being incouraged by the military command structure and a sort of pack mentality. While it would appear taht they did become more comfortable with the slaughters and more eager to participate, it is highly doubtful that any of them would have come to the conclusion this needed to be done and then carry it out without it coming down the chain of command.

The pack mentality in the military cannot be overstated either. When you have a large group of people in a command type structure reinforcing each other dissent is an exceptional not a normal action. It is highly likely that their first reaction was to obey orders and that they simply reinforced each other and they were able to defer responsiblity both to command and each other. It's only natural to look for evil men, and to think that they were somehow unique, but they were not. As an "ordinary man" I can't imagine doing something like this and I'd like to think I'd resist despite what those around me were doing and I was being told to do. However reading about the events of Nazi Germany I can also be grateful that I live in a sane society where it is nearly universally acknowledged that such brutality is wrong and that I will likely never be in such a position..

The Mandate to Govern

I find it interesting how it was nearly impossible to form a coalition during the latter part of Weimar Germany. As the nation became increasingly fragmented the more established poltiical parties were abandoned by many in favor of several more radical parties who were more in line with their specific agendas. This allowed for a climate where Hitler was able to become Chanellor without what could be considered a clear mandate from the electorate. Instead he
simply relied on the Nazis being the most supported party in an extremely fragmented country where the other main parties were having a difficult time working together.

When thinking about this it is interesting to compare the Weimar situation to situations where you have fewer competing political parties that try to have broader interests, and are less focused on individual groups. Safer more established parties such as the the old liberals, the SPD, and the Center Party were being abandoned for more radical parties which were more specializded in their target constituencies. The effect of this was that the Nazis were eventually able to take power without a mandate and with alliances that were of necessity not of idealogical compatability.

This problem is especially interesting to compare to the American two party system where you have parties that can draw from extremely varied constituencies and tie together different types of issues which shouldn't necessarily be tied together. However forcing groups to operate under one big tent can have a moderating effect. In order to have success as a party it is necessary to have broad appeal, and to come together to resolve matters within the party even when there are differences or they run the risk of losing power altogether.

This is not to say that the reason for Germany's problems was that it had too many competing political parties because given that multi-party systems are far more common than two party systems and it clearly does not create instability in many of these countries. However it did have a very interesting effect in what was already an extremely fragmented poltiical situation. When voters continually splintered off from moderate political parties in favor of more radical groups the anymosity proved to make it impossible for a governable majority. The result was the Nazis emerging without a clear mandate. However not having clear control of the Reichstag did not prevent Hitler from solidifying his power in other ways once he was established.

Modern War and Nationalism

Compared to previous wars, the scale of World War I required complete commitment from the nations involved in terms of troops and resources. In Germany this helped promote a sense of nationalism, and all Germans began to consider themselves as having a stake in the success of the war. Frietsche describes 1914 as a turning point where Germany was not united behind the Kaiser or the German state, but that the country began to rally together as a nation of the German people.

Support for the war was not universal. Many groups had opposed the war, and Frietzsche notes that there were attempted protests, and that while many took to the streets in 1914 there was not a universal sense of the glory of war, and that many were not excited about fighting. However it was clear that they were all Germans, and that they were in it together.

We've spent the last month talking about different groups in German society, and how thPoey effected the direction of Germany. The successes and failures of political leaders, and political parties had played large roles in getting to 1914. However with Burgfrieden it seemed there was a temporary new order where everyone had to work together for the good of the country. Fears of socialism were put on hold, and all groups worked together to support the troops, and there families who were frequently in dire straits. War bonds were bought, and at least early on there was relatively little unrest until famines, and failures started to turn the tide of popular attitudes. World War I was the people's war even if they didn's start it.

Politically Germans would not continue to agree. Later on some wanted to pull back, and some felt that the elites had sold the German army out by pulling back. The Conservatives and Social Democrats would continue to fight, and the party that later became the Nazis was formed even if it didn't have full traction during this period. What had been established though was that everyone had a stake in Germany. From this point there weren't Prussians, or Bavarians, or Wurtenbergs. German unification was complete, and the German people would suffer together because of the war. There was a power vacuum for a new Germany, and the people would have a say in Germany's future for better or for worse.

Rural Populism

The Blackbourn reading was interesting in that it looked at a different dimension of Imperial Germany's political evolution compared to the theories we have been looking at the last 2 weeks or so which have generally revolved around elite politics, industrialization, and general political ideals. As we've discussed a high percentage of the population did reside in rural areas, and with increased democratization the rural community was a powerful constituency either for a new political movement or for an exisiting group to try to form a coalition with.

The most disturbing thing about rural Germany was their general mistrust for outsiders and change. While the rural community did have economic interests, their ideas about cultural matters, provided an opportunity for certain political groupsCertain political groups, most notably the conservatives, could build rural culture and promote their cultural attitudes at no expense to themselves. Anti-semitisim found its way into mainstream politics during this period while under Bismarck Jews had flourished in Germany.

We have discussed a lot of factors that had huge influences on Germany's future. Liberalism did fail and authoritarianism did take hold after WWI. However it is impossible to discuss Nazi Germany without first looking at the Holocaust. It appears that this rural political phenomenon may have created a culture where the Jews could be made a scapegoat for fallout of the military failures that were soon to come. We all know the consequences of that connection.

I also find the exploitation of the rural population's mistrust of outsiders an important cautionary tale. Even in this country it is common practice to pander for votes by fighting "culture wars". Certain groups are held to be representative of superior values, and by implication culturally superior to other groups. It's a cheap alliance because unscrupulous individuals can promote their own agenda simply by making cultural statements where they pay no cost for pleasing certain constituencies.

German militarism

This week we discussed many factors from the Second Reich that undoubtedly played some role in molding the future of Germany from World War I to the rise of the Third Reich. While reading and discussing the Historiography one particular thing stood out to me, and that was Nipperty's assertion that the one thing that could be considered uniquely German from the period was militarism. The Prussian military was the most conservative and undemocratic institution in Imperial Germany, and it played a great role in forming the alliances that led to World War I. Undoubtedly the hardships and humilition suffered by Germany as a result of the first World War created the political void which was exploited by the Nazis and led to the tragic events of the Holocaust and World War II.

Bismarck's first actions after rising to power involved making concessions to the liberals and progressives in domestic affairs. Bismarck laid the framework for national unity which the liberals had failed at in 1848 and he agreed to universal suffrage at least for elections in the new Reichstag. These were notable goals of the liberals and progressives, and it begs the question of what did the conservatives get early on out of their supposedly conservative chancellor. The answer is that he protected the military and with his gap theory allowed funding changes in the structure of the military without legislative approval.

The military maintained autonomy after the founding of the Reich. It was the military cabinet that told Austria Germany would support them in the event of a conflict in the Balkans as discussed in the textbook, and this was done unilaterally without involving the civilian government. This had disastrous consequences as it led to World War I, and many in the military including Schlieffen considered military matters to be above civilians.

The composition of the military is also important to note. The aristocracy had a near monopoly on officer positions. A few Bourgeois were allowed to gain promotions as the military grew larger, but only if they were considered politically safe. Jews were also excluded from officer ranks in most cases. The military was dominated by the conservative, aristocratic establishment. It control was undemocratic and authoritarian.

Nipperty was correct in his assertion that militarism was what seperated Germany from the rest of Europe during this period. While as he notes here were many factors and individual decisions that played a role in molding Germany's future there can be little doubt that there were decisions of great importance in foreign relations that were made excluding civilian oversight and that the military was insulated from any political modernization in Germany. There are a variety of reasons why this was accepted and I'm not going to go into them here, but I do believe that it was military culture that led to World War I and may have played a role even beyond that.

The demise of the German liberal

When studying the German liberal it is fascinating how in a period of about 30 years they went from a progressive force on the rise in German politics, to allies of the conservative Chancellor Bismarck, to a position of decline where they could no longer form a coalition that could be a serious threat for power in German politics. I had been thinking about their change of fortune before reading Barkin's article for class on Monday, and it gave a very interesting perspective on how the liberals were both elitest and progressive and thus caught in a no man's land of sorts during an extremely dynamic period of German history

Given that the liberals had risen as an opposition party to the conservative establishment it is interesting to me that they took an elitest political philosophy regarding democracy. In the beginning the liberals benefited a great deal from industrialisation, and their opposition to feudal privilege. This made them extremely appealing to the middle classes and won some support from the lower classes. However they were resistent to working with large segments of the population because they did not see them as informed or educated enough to participate in government. They opposed Democracy and chose to align with Bismarck who represented the interests to which they had originally been opposed.

Given that the liberals were opposed to Bismarck's largest constituency, namely the military and the nobility it is not surprising that they eventually had a falling out. It almost seems that it was an alliance based on who both parties did not like as opposed to mutual interests. In the process the liberals made a lot of enemies in the working classes and with Catholics thus reducing the possibility of forming future alliances.

While Barkin notes that many of Bismarck's policies did work out for the liberals, I feel that their loss of political power left a void in German politics. While their economic positions were dramatically different from the socialists and workers, it would not have been impossible for them to have had some political ties and they could have been a moderating force between the two groups. They also could have provided an alternative to the militaristic policies of the conservatives, and could have allied with teh socialist in opposing Bismarck's favortism towards the Junker class.

Utopian politics does not exist in the real world. It is necessary to form alliances, and unfortunately the best and the brightest do not usually rise to power and govern in a non-partisan way. The liberals had some ideas that could have been very good for Germany, and Germany needed them in a position of power but their own elitism and unwillingness to be politicall inclusive prevented them from any chance of forming a coalition that could bring checks on Bismarck.